The Philosophies of the Aesthetic Sublime

Max Lester | maxsamuellester@gmail.com
B.A. in Global Liberal Studies, 2014 | New York University, New York
Associate Director, Business and Legal Affairs | The Orchard, Sony Music Entertainment

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Abstract

This article explores the Classical and Romantic philosophical theories of the sublime in the works of Longinus, Hegel, Burke, and Kant using architectural and art historical elements as a means of analysis. In studying these philosophers’ definitions of the sublime, from mathematical perfection to the ineffable chaos of nature, the sublime is seen to stem from various visual catalysts. While the sublime may not be caused by the same visual stimulus, the emotion of the sublime appears universal.

Keywords
Aesthetic Sublime; Beauty; Longinus; G.W.F. Hegel; Edmund Burke; Immanuel Kant; Anthropomorphic Columns; Ancient Greek Columns; Soul; Sublime Emotion
While the concept of the sublime, the awe that accompanies rare visual stimuli, has permeated human existence for thousands of years, this article brings together the Classical and Romantic philosophical theories of the sublime in the works of Longinus, G.W.F. Hegel, Edmund Burke, and Immanuel Kant. In exploring these philosophers’ definitions of the sublime, from mathematical perfection to the ineffable chaos of nature, the sublime is seen to stem from various visual catalysts.

The earliest and most notable contribution to the discourse on the sublime before the 18th and 19th century is written by Longinus. While there is no historical evidence to firmly attribute this treatise to a specific author, it has been thought that Περί χυπσους, On the Sublime, was written by a Greek rhetorician, Cassius Longinus, minister to Zenobia, the queen of Palmyra, now modern day Syria, in the 3rd century B.C.E.¹ However, whereas Philological Discourses and Homeric Questions are firmly ascribed to Cassius Longinus, it has been proposed that On the Sublime was written two centuries later by another Greek named Longinus.² Whether this Longinus lived in the 3rd or 1st century B.C.E, he is the first in surviving text to clearly define the aesthetic sublime. He links the sublime feeling with that of awe, writing that “by some innate power, the true sublime uplifts our souls; [and] we are filled with a proud exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy.”³

Interestingly, the term Longinus uses that translates as sublimity, ὑψος⁴, does not mean precisely what later philosophers associate with the sublime; that is, a feeling of exaltation and awe in relation to a visual stimulus. Instead, ὑψος relates more closely to a distinction or excellence of artistic expression, both in the visual and oratory senses. While Longinus is, at times, tangential

³ Dorsch, Classical Literary Criticism, 107.
⁴ Pronounced hypsos
in his discussion, he always returns to his main argument, “the qualities and devices that make for, or militate against, the production of the sublime.” Longinus clearly defines the sublime as a characteristic of the visual and bases his argument around the idea that this attribute may be created by following certain guidelines. Although Longinus’ treatise is focused on discourse and the creation of the sublime in oration, he does speak on the aesthetic sublime and proposes a basis on which the visual sublime is judged, relying on control and laws. He argues with his contemporaries who claim that genius “is innate; it is not something that can be learnt, and nature is the only art that begets it. Works of natural genius are spoilt, they believe when they are reduced to the bare bones of rules and systems.” By taking the opposing viewpoint in regards to the sublime, Longinus states “nature is…subject only to her own laws where sublime feelings are concerned, she is not given to acting at random and wholly without system.” Therefore, nature, as a system, must “prescribe the degree and the right moment for each [activity], and lay down the clearest rules for use and practice.” Longinus argues that because the sublime is controlled by, and a product of nature, and because nature is governed by rules, the sublime must therefore be controlled by rules as well.

This link between the sublime and a set of laws and guidelines later influenced the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831 C.E) as he developed a definition of the sublime that relies heavily on pattern and ornament, which he believed was an essential mediating link between form and rational construction. The Classical definition of an ordered and rationalized sublime, as Longinus had put forth, can be plainly seen in Hegel’s writing as he describes the aesthetic sublime as a visual attribute and defining characteristic of an object or piece

5 Dorsch, Classical Literary Criticism, 25.
6 Dorsch, Classical Literary Criticism, 101.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
of art. The aesthetic sublime “can be tangibly represented, which then stirs our soul.”

For Hegel and Longinus, beauty is synonymous with the aesthetic sublime because the sublime is used as an attribute rather than a feeling. Therefore, a work of art is qualified as itself sublime rather than producing a sublime feeling. Hegel’s aesthetic of beauty and therefore sublimity is a conception that relates the disparate parts of an artwork. By producing a definition of the sublime that embodies a determinate unity of defined expression, Hegel argues that the sublime is reserved for an aesthetic that illustrates the union and relation of all pieces of an object or artwork. For this very reason, Hegel is fascinated by Greek and Roman architecture, an art form that relies on precise mathematical calculation to create a harmonious structure of interlocking and unified fragments.

In the second volume of Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art (1842), he discusses aesthetics and inquires into the definition of the sublime as a rational construction in architecture in the chapters “The Specific Forms of the Temple” and “The Classical Temple as a Whole.” He focuses on the column as a structural support and as a work of art that unifies, in this case, a Greek Temple. However, before exemplifying his claim that the column is the vehicle of a sublime structure, Hegel clearly states that in this sublime unification, the different parts of a structure are “fitted together on intelligent [i.e. mathematical] principals.”11 Hegel begins by comparing a column to a wall. Both serve the purpose of support, yet the wall “serves to enclose and connect.”12 Based on this observation, the wall fulfills one of the requirements for the sublime, the unification and connection of all parts of a structure.

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12 Hegel, Aesthetics, II: 666.
However, what mesmerizes Hegel, and causes him to identify the Greek column as sublime, is the transference of the structural properties of the wall into a work of sculpture. “The peculiarity of Greek architecture is at once seen to consist in the fact that [the column] gives shape to this supporting [of a structure] as such and therefore employs the column as the fundamental element in the purposiveness of architecture and its beauty.” However, in order to be qualified as Hegelian sublime, the column must have a distinct beginning and end. In keeping with Longinus’ definition of a regulated and controlled sublime, Hegel reasons that “developed and beautiful architecture supplies the column with a pedestal and capital,” because art must have a defined beginning and end. Without these crucial boundaries, visual art is “as if, in music, there were a cadence without a firm conclusion, or [a book that does] not end with a full stop or begin without the emphasis of a capital letter.” Furthering his argument that the sublime is truly a perfect union between art and function, Hegel goes on to warn the reader that art should not consume the column; “we are not to regard [the column] as superfluous, nor should we attempt to derive them from the example of Egyptian columns which still take the plant kingdom [and human forms] as their typical model. Organic products, as they are portrayed by sculpture in the shapes of animals and men, have their beginning and end in their own free outlines.” In defining anthropomorphic columns as possessing a “free outline,” Hegel argues that these columns are inferior due to their lack of a defined base and capital.

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Hegel, Aesthetics, II: 668.
16 Ibid.
Condemning naturalism and anthropomorphism in columns, Hegel declares that sublime and beautiful art is art whose sole objective is to bring out and give shape to “the particular aspects implicit in…a column.”\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, the Hegelian architectural sublime is a perfect balance of form and function coupled with defined borders. One of the most succinct explanations Hegel gives to define the aesthetic architectural sublime describes art as something that creates a focal point through beauty by which the true nature of an object is highlighted. The “beginning and ending are determinations implicit in the very nature of a column as a support and on this account

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics}, II: 668.
must come into appearance on it.”\footnote{Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics}, II: 666.} For this very reason, an anthropomorphic column is not sublime for Hegel, as it does not prominently display the capital and pedestal of the column and clouds the true function of the column as a structural support and not a statue.

Hegel goes on to explore the classification of Greek columns and devises a method to evaluate each type, focusing primarily on the Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian styles, though he does briefly mention Tuscan and early Greek styles as well. In his own categorization of orders, Hegel relies on the Classical belief that natural imagery coupled with mathematics and order is the basis for aesthetic beauty and sublimity: “Architecture must modify organic forms mathematically into regularity, and pass over to purposiveness, while conversely mere purposiveness of form has to move towards the principle of the organic. Where these two extremes meet and mutually interpenetrate, really beautiful classical architecture is born.”\footnote{Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics}, II: 656.} When the aesthetics of chaotic nature are regulated by order and logic, and the purely functional incorporates some of the organic creativity of nature, sublime aesthetics are formed. This idea greatly influences Hegel’s taste; his appreciation for the application of controlled natural themes in art and architecture can be seen in his writings on the Corinthian style columns.
Figure 3: From the Encyclopedie de Diderot et d’Alembert, this plate shows the capitals of the Doric (top), Ionic (center) and Corinthian (bottom) orders and their defining traits.22

Because the Doric and Ionic orders are characterized by short, faceted columns with round capitals and no base, and slender, fluted pillars with a large base and two opposed volutes (or scrolls) in the capital, respectively, and do not fall under this duality of natural form and function, Hegel considers them to be aesthetically inferior. The Corinthian order is the most ornate of the Greek orders; it is characterized by slender, fluted columns with an ornate capital decorated with acanthus leaves and four volutes. As a result of this decoration, this type of “column arises from a form borrowed from nature which is then reshaped…into a regular and geometrical form.”23 Because it represents the unification and balanced duality found in the natural form coupled with articulated function, a delineated base and capital, Hegel favors it over all other types of columns.

23 Hegel, Aesthetics, II: 659.
While Hegel comes from a very Classical, rational, and mathematical position when defining the aesthetic sublime, he is a true product of his time and, writing alongside Romantic philosophers like Kant and Burke, he pauses to characterize the feeling that accompanies this quality. Although Hegel’s aesthetic sublime is truly an extension of Longinian and Ancient Greek thought, Hegel’s chapter on the feeling of divine sublimity comes very close to expressing a Romantic analysis of the aesthetic sublime. Instead of focusing on the sublime as an extension of art or architecture, Romantic thought of the 18th century began attributing the aesthetic sublime to an emotional response. Nature became the most sublime object, capable of generating the strongest sensations, terror and awe, in its beholders. Because this sublime emotion was connected to fear and wonder in response to nature, the image attributed to this feeling is immeasurability and infinity. As Hegel puts it, “in general, the sublime is the attempt to express the infinite.”

Hegel, though rooted in the Classical Greek definition of an ordered, architectural aesthetic sublime, slowly moves towards this idea of a sublime feeling when faced with infinity in nature, yet attributes it to the divine and human rationality, not an uncontrolled emotional response. The sublime is “only in our soul, in the sense that we are superior to nature…the true sublime…only belongs to matters of the mind.”

It is interesting that while Hegel begins to qualify the sublime feeling as something intangible and infinite, he still clarifies that the sublime is a human intellectual quality, and superior to nature, in the way that he connects the soul and the sublime. The sublime feeling is not caused by nature, as the Romantics believe, but it is rather a search to define the infinite that is part of human nature. This search for the infinite in each of us is directly attributed to the search for the divine. The sublime feeling is defined as pure awe because, Hegel argues, it

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25 The original quote in French reads: “…n’est que dans notre âme, en tant que nous pouvons avoir conscience de notre supériorité sur la nature…le véritable sublime…n’appartient qu’aux idées de la raison.” Ibid.
is a brief connection to the divine. Nonetheless, this momentary brush with the divine is only a shadow of the true awe of God because it is caused by one of God’s creations and not an interaction with God Himself. In this brief sensation, the divine “will be revealed by this [sensation] in the real world, with splendor, pomp and magnificence with which He graces our eyes, but it is only an instrument, an ephemeral appearance in comparison to God himself, the eternal and immutable being.”

Though Hegel does begin to formulate a specific definition of the sublime in terms of emotional response, he attributes this sublimity to a brush with the divine and a feeling of awe and enlightenment. Edmund Burke (1729-1797), an Irish philosopher and a contemporary of Hegel, published his *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* in 1757, which defines the sublime as a purely emotional experience, and clearly classifies the sublime and the beautiful as mutually exclusive. Burke does not equate the sublime to any aesthetic qualities; rather, he focuses on how various emotions caused by a visual experience produce the sublime. Of the many visual experiences that induce a feeling of the sublime, Burke lists light, darkness, vastness, uniformity, and magnitude in building, among others. Beauty, on the other hand, is defined as a visual stimulus that causes pleasure and is easily defined, by Burke, in terms of size, shape, color, and texture:

> On the whole, the qualities of beauty, as they are merely sensible qualities, are the following. First, to be comparatively small. Secondly, to be smooth. Thirdly, to have a variety in the direction of the parts; but fourthly, to have those parts not angular, but melted

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26 The original quote in French reads: “…sera révélée par cela même que le monde réel, avec la splendeur, la pompe et la magnificence qu’il offre a nos regards, n’est qu’un…instrument, une apparence éphémère en comparaison de Dieu, l’être éternelle et immuable.” Hegel, *Esthétique*, 472.

as it were into each other.  

Fifthly, to be of a delicate frame, without any remarkable appearance of strength.

Burke reasons that although the sublime and beauty can be found together and used conjointly, the true sublime stands alone for the very fact that it entails an extremely strong emotional response:

If I make a drawing of a palace, or a temple, or a landscape, I present a very clear idea of those objects; but then my picture can affect only as the palace, temple, or landscape would have affected in reality. On the other hand, the most lively and spirited verbal description I can give raises a very obscure and imperfect idea of such objects; but then it is in my power to raise a stronger emotion by the description than I could do by the best painting.

That is, a specific visual image, say, a landscape, can be either beautiful, as a drawing, or sublime, in the imagination of this landscape. In this same vein, Burke speaks of light as being in the realm of the beautiful as well as the sublime. An object may appear beautiful because it is accentuated by light, yet intense light or darkness (as the absence of light) is sublime as it obscures sight.

While the sublime emotion is induced by a visual experience, for Burke the sublime has no relation to aesthetic pleasure, since the strongest emotions, those emotions that are sublime, are actually caused by terror and a suspension of reason:

[The true] passion caused by the…sublime in nature, when those causes [terror and awe] operate most powerfully, is astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case, the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it.

Burke’s sublime is a feeling of awe and fear caused by nature, in which the emotional response is so great that the capacity to define what is causing the sublime feeling is suspended.

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28 This necessity for multiple, diverse parts, becoming one unit is reminiscent of the Classical definition of the sublime by Longinus and Hegel. In this sense, as well as in the way in which Burke speaks of the universality of beauty on page 146 of *Philosophical Enquiry*, the Burkean definition of beauty resembles the Classical definition of the sublime.

29 Burke, *Philosophical Enquiry*, 151.

30 Burke, *Philosophical Enquiry*, 104.

31 Burke speaks in depth on the concept of light and darkness in relation to the sublime on page 121 of *Philosophical Enquiry*.

One of the most powerful causes of the sublime in Burke’s *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* is the sensation of vastness and infinity:

Greatness of dimension is a powerful cause of the sublime...However...as the great extreme of dimension is sublime, so the last extreme of littleness is in some measure sublime likewise; when we attend to the infinite divisibility of matter...when we push our discoveries yet downward...the imagination is lost as well as the sense, we become amazed and confounded at the wonders of minuteness; nor can we distinguish in its effect this extreme of littleness form the vast itself.\(^{33}\)

It is interesting that Burke is extremely adamant in his argument that horror must somehow be incorporated into an emotion for that emotion to be sublime: “Infinity has a tendency to fill the mind with that sort of delightful horror, which is the most genuine effect, and truest test of the sublime.”\(^{34}\)

The most unique of Burke’s examples of visual stimuli that invokes the sublime feeling is also the most telling in Burke’s departure from the Classical definition of the sublime as tied to aesthetic beauty. Burke writes, “Ugliness I imagine likewise to be consistent enough with an idea of the sublime. [Ugliness] is a sublime idea [when] united with such qualities as excite a strong terror.”\(^{35}\) This passage clearly reiterates that, for Burke, the sublime has no tie to aesthetic beauty and pleasing form. The sublime is in of itself a feeling that can be caused by a number of varied visual stimuli, usually accompanied by an extremely strong emotion, like terror.

While Burke creates a sort of checklist by which the beautiful may be defined and characterized, Immanuel Kant refutes the objectification of beauty in his *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Kant argues instead:

If we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not, we do not refer to the representation of it to the object by means of the understanding with a view of cognition...we refer the representation to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgment of taste, therefore, is not a cognitive judgment, and so not

\(^{33}\) Burke, *Philosophical Enquiry*, 114.
\(^{34}\) Burke, *Philosophical Enquiry*, 115.
\(^{35}\) Burke, *Philosophical Enquiry*, 152.
logical, but is aesthetic—which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective.\textsuperscript{36}

Kant therefore describes the characteristic of beauty, which he still attributes as a quality of an object,\textsuperscript{37} as unique to the viewer and therefore impossible to define in universal terms. Kant embraces the idea of “beauty in the eye of the beholder”, and unlike Burke, argues:

There can be no objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful may be defined by means of concepts. For every judgment from that source is aesthetic, i.e. its determining ground is the feeling of the subject, and not any concept of an object. It is merely wasted labor to look for a principle of taste that affords a universal criterion of the beautiful by determinate concept of an object.\textsuperscript{38}

It is interesting that in Kant, beauty is attributed as a characteristic of an object, yet is defined as causing a feeling with regard to the subject. Therefore, there is a transfer from the aesthetic quality of an object determined ‘beautiful’ to the sensory response of the viewer. In terms of the sublime, Kant posits that “the beautiful and the sublime agree on the point of pleasing on their own account. Further they agree in not presupposing either a judgment of the senses or a logically determining judgment, but one of reflection.”\textsuperscript{39} Therefore both the feelings caused by beauty and the sublime are singular and cause a feeling of pleasure purely based on visual appreciation, without any prior knowledge of the object. Kant reasons that the result of these feelings causes a moment of reflection after the fact. Whereas Kant argues that both beauty and the sublime influence our feelings, the scope of each is clear: “The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of the object, and this consists in limitation,\textsuperscript{40} whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of

\textsuperscript{37} Kant approaches “the beautiful as if beauty were a feature of the object.” Kant, \textit{Critique of Judgement}, 43.
\textsuperscript{38} Kant, \textit{Critique of Judgement}, 62.
\textsuperscript{39} Kant, \textit{Critique of Judgement}, 75.
\textsuperscript{40} It is interesting that the Kantian definition of beauty is to be found in limitation and a defined object, the very definition of the Classical sublime in Hegel. See Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics}, II: 666-668.
Kant regards the sublime as less of a characteristic of nature, and more as a human recognition of internal feelings of insignificance and impotence when faced with the immensity and immeasurability of nature:

But in what we are wont to call sublime in nature there is such an absence of anything leading to particular objective principles…that it is rather in its chaos, or in its wildest and most irregular disorder and desolation, provided it gives signs of magnitude and power, that nature chiefly excites the ideas of the sublime.42

It is also important to note that Kant only expresses the sublime in terms of nature, because the Kantian sublime can only be found in nature: “The sublime [is found in] objects of nature ([objects] of art being always restricted by the conditions of an agreement with nature).”43

While Kant defines both the beautiful and the sublime as the basis for an emotional response, he is clear in the delineation and differentiation of these feelings. Beauty is associated with intellectual understanding and a type of pleasure that comes from a sense of fulfillment and understanding.44 Conversely, the sublime is likened to awe, “the momentary check to the vital forces,”45 not unlike Burke’s sublime, defined as “astonishment…in which all motions are suspended,”46 and not unlike Hegel’s or Longinus’ definition in which the sublime halts emotion and “stirs our soul”47 and “uplifts our souls,”48 respectively.

It is significant that, while each philosopher defines the sublime differently, whether in the Classical or Romantic sense, as order, divine reaction, terror, or immensity in nature, the sublime

41 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 75.
42 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 77.
43 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 76. Further references regarding the argument of the sublime as only present in nature and of art as a product of beauty and not sublimity, can be found in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, 134, 136, 148-164.
44 “Accordingly, the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation as an indeterminate concept of the understanding…the beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of the furtherance of life, and is thus compatible with charms and a playful imagination.” Kant, Critique of Judgement, 75.
45 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 76.
46 Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, 101.
47 The original quote in French reads: “…se spectacle émeut notre âme.” Hegel, Esthétique, 470.
48 Dorsch, Classical Literary Criticism, 107.
emotion is defined almost identically. While the sublime may not be caused by the same visual stimulus for every one of us, the emotion of the sublime appears universal and, as shown through each of these philosophers’ work, transcends both time and space.

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