Concern for the In-Group and Opposition to Affirmative Action

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The present experiments suggest that the desire to benefit the in-group drives dominant-group members’ policy preferences, independent of concern for out-groups’ outcomes. In Experiment 1, the effect of a manipulation of affirmative action procedures on policy support was mediated by how Whites expected the policy to affect fellow Whites, but not by the expected effect on minorities. In Experiments 2 and 3, when focused on losses for the White in-group, Whites’ racial identity was negatively related to support for affirmative action. However, when focused on gains for the Black out-group or when participants were told that Whites were not affected by the policy, racial identity did not predict attitudes toward the policy. In Experiments 2 and 3, perceived fairness mediated these effects.

Keywords: affirmative action, race, White identity, group interest

Hostility and discord between social groups are the sources of much human misery. For this reason, social scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to understanding the psychological roots of intergroup conflict. According to one approach, intergroup conflict reflects individuals’ desire to maximize their own group’s outcomes relative to those of competing groups—that is, to enlarge the gap (in economic power, access to jobs, educational opportunities, or other social resources) between the in-group and the out-group (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Such an advantage-maximizing motivation should lead individuals to make choices intended to increase the in-group’s resources (i.e., in-group favoritism) and to minimize the out-group’s resources (i.e., out-group discrimination). According to a different perspective, intergroup conflict reflects a desire to harm disliked groups, regardless of the expected effect on the in-group. Such a harming motivation should lead individuals to engage in out-group discrimination but not necessarily in in-group favoritism. The vast majority of work on prejudice and discrimination—which focuses on how antipathy toward out-groups leads people to mistreat out-group members—adopts this second perspective (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1998; Kinder & Sanders, 1996).

Despite their differences, these approaches to intergroup conflict are alike in portraying individuals’ preferences as driven, in whole or in part, by a concern for the out-group’s outcomes. Neither perspective addresses the possibility that preferences reflect a concern for one’s own group, independent of competing groups’ outcomes. In this article, we suggest that current research on intergroup conflict underestimates the importance of pure group interest—that is, the desire to benefit the in-group irrespective of expected out-group outcomes—as a determinant of intergroup discord.

Motivations Underlying Intergroup Conflict and Opposition to Affirmative Action

Individuals are rarely in a position to personally and directly influence the outcomes of entire social groups. Nonetheless, individuals are free to develop (and vote in accordance with) social policy attitudes that they expect will affect in-group and out-group outcomes. Given this, a large body of literature in the social sciences has examined individuals’ policy preferences as a way of testing various accounts of intergroup conflict (Bobo, 1983, 2000; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997; Federico & Sidanis, 2002a, 2002b; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout, 1994; Sears, Hetts, Sidanis, & Bobo, 2000; Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997; Sidanis, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). One of the most commonly studied policies is also one of the most contentious: affirmative action.

Affirmative action was originally designed to promote the inclusion of individuals belonging to groups previously excluded from the labor market (Pratkanis & Turner, 1996). Despite widespread support for the egalitarian ideals that inspired affirmative action, the policy has met with considerable resistance from Whites (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). Whites’ willingness to oppose a policy specifically designed to help minorities has yielded fertile ground on which to test theories of intergroup conflict. Three theoretical perspectives have made extensive use of this terrain: (a) group-dominance approaches, which argue that Whites are motivated to maximize the in-group’s economic fortunes relative to minorities; (b) principled-opposition approaches, which suggest that Whites’ affirmative action attitudes are driven by principled objections to the policy, rather than by concerns for the policy’s outcome; and (c) racism approaches, which argue that Whites’ opposition to affirmative action is driven by anti-Black...
animus. We suggest that each of these approaches pays insufficient attention to the role of Whites’ concern for their own group’s outcomes in shaping policy preferences. Thus, we propose a fourth alternative, positing that Whites’ concern for their group’s outcomes influences support for affirmative action over and above the policy’s expected effect on minorities.

**Group Dominance and Advantage Maximization**

A number of social scientists have argued that Whites’ “group dominance” motivation—that is, the desire to maximize in-group advantage relative to minorities—drives attitudes toward affirmative action and other race-based policies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Much of the evidence cited to support this view shows that a threat to the in-group’s relative position in the social hierarchy affects policy support (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Niemann, 1998; Schuman et al., 1997; Sears & Funk, 1990). For example, Whites who believe that Blacks’ gains undermine Whites’ economic opportunities are significantly more opposed to government interventions designed to help Blacks than are Whites who do not perceive such a threat (Bobo, 1998; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). There is also evidence that individual differences in the desire for hierarchy predict opposition to policies designed to attenuate social inequality (Federico & Sidanius, 2002a; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Proponents of this account typically assume that Whites define their group’s position relative to the position of the minority group (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 2000).

**Principled Objections**

Another line of research eschews outcomes altogether and suggests that opposition is driven by the belief that affirmative action violates the principle of meritocracy—the ideal that people should be rewarded on the basis of talent and effort rather than group membership (Boboel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998; Heilman, Battle, Keller, & Lee, 1998; Nacoste, 1990, 1994a, 1994b; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Proponents of this approach argue that concerns about the procedures associated with affirmative action, rather than anticipated outcomes, determine attitudes toward the policy. Consistent with this hypothesis, individuals oppose strong affirmative action procedures (e.g., quotas), which weigh group status heavily in the selection process, more than they oppose relatively weak procedures (e.g., minority-targeted job advertisements), which give little weight to group status in the selection process (Boboel et al., 1998; Kravitz & Platania, 1993).

**Racism Approaches**

Another group of theorists argues that policy preferences and behaviors that harm out-group members stem largely from negative attitudes toward out-groups (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Jacobson, 1985; Kluegel & Smith, 1983; Sears & Funk, 1990). Consistent with this claim, evidence suggests that overt (i.e., old-fashioned) racism predicts opposition to policies like affirmative action (Jacobson, 1985; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kravitz, 1995). Research also suggests that, within some individuals, anti-Black affect and egalitarian ideals coexist uncomfortably, resulting in the expression of racism only when such expressions can be attributed to race-neutral factors (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991, 1996; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Gaertner et al., 1997). For example, when opposition can be attributed to the unfairness of a policy, Whites oppose the policy more when it aids Blacks than when it helps other groups. However, when the policy is perceived to be fair, attitudes toward the policy are less sensitive to the identity of the beneficiaries (Murrell et al., 1994).

The symbolic racism approach suggests that individuals develop anti-Black predispositions early in life and that these predispositions ultimately shape attitudes toward policies commonly associated with Blacks (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988). Measures of symbolic racism predict Whites’ opposition to policies specifically designed to benefit Blacks, even after controlling for the effects of old-fashioned forms of racism (Henry & Sears, 2002; Sears et al., 1997). In sum, despite differences between perspectives focusing on manifestations of racism (e.g., old-fashioned, aversive, and symbolic), each of these approaches claims that anti-Black attitudes predispose individuals against policies designed to improve the lot of Blacks.

The Independent Effect of In-Group Outcomes

The possibility that opposition to affirmative action reflects in-group interest, independent of motives toward the out-group, has implications for the three approaches to intergroup conflict discussed above. If responses to in-group and out-group outcomes are separable, individuals could simultaneously seek to advance the interests of both groups. Thus, evidence that concern for the in-group affects policy attitudes would not conclusively indicate the operation of dominance motives. Similarly, findings in which procedural strength affects policy support even after controlling for prejudice do not provide conclusive evidence for the principled-opposition approach, because the possibility remains that concern for in-group outcomes drives the effect.

The potential effect of concern for the in-group on policy attitudes tends to be outside the purview of studies that explore the effect of racism on attitudes toward affirmative action. Typically, the definition of racism focuses on antipathy toward stigmatized racial groups (Allport, 1954; Kinloch, 1974; Myrdal, 1964). Research suggests that such antipathy, in various guises, continues to influence attitudes toward members of stigmatized racial groups and toward policies designed to improve the social and economic standing of these groups (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Devine, 1989; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 1994). However, absent a discussion of dominant-group members’ concern for the in-group, consumers of research on racism may mistakenly assume that the problem of race, as it relates to Whites, is a problem only of racial prejudice against minorities.

A number of studies suggest that group interest affects attitudes toward affirmative action (J. Baron, 2001; Tougas, Beaton, & Veilleux, 1991; Veilleux & Tougas, 1989). For instance, members of groups that benefit from affirmative action (e.g., women and ethnic minorities) typically support the policy more than do non-beneficiaries (Bobo, 1998; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000). One of the few studies to experimentally examine the effect of expected outcomes did so by manipulating the degree to which an affirmative action policy weighed group membership in the hiring decision (Kravitz, 1995). It is not surprising
that the more an affirmative action procedure weighed race in the selection process, the more Whites opposed the policy. Moreover, this relationship was mediated by the perceived deleterious impact of strong procedures on the in-group’s anticipated outcomes.

There is good reason to believe that the concern of the in-group evident in these studies does not carry with it a concomitant desire to harm out-groups. Indeed, individuals frequently express a desire to favor their own group while at the same time adopting an apathetic or even benevolent stance toward out-groups (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1979, 1999; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; Jackman, 1994; Raden, 2003). In many situations, comparisons to either past states or imagined outcomes obviate the need for intergroup comparisons and thus result in group-interest behavior that is unresponsive to the outcomes of out-groups. In the context of race, some have gone so far as to suggest that racial prejudice in the post-Civil Rights era is more likely to take the form of pro-White than anti-Black bias (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Gaertner et al., 1997).

Extant studies examining the effect of anticipated group outcomes on policy attitudes fail to distinguish between beneficiaries’ and nonbeneficiaries’ outcomes; therefore, it is impossible to say precisely how outcomes led participants to oppose the policy. Specifically, individuals in these studies may have expected the policy to increase the minority group’s opportunities, close the gap between the two groups, or decrease the majority group’s opportunities. More generally, studies that fail to directly assess outcomes or that assess either only in-group or out-group outcomes tacitly assume that the motive to help the in-group and the motive to harm out-groups represent opposite poles on a single dimension. We hypothesized that, all else equal, Whites will support a policy to the extent that it is perceived to help minorities. However, on the basis of evidence that the effect of egalitarian motives is fragile to the extent that it is perceived to help minorities, we concluded that our online participants were less sensitive to social desirability pressures (e.g., racism) in our online samples than in comparable lab-based samples (cf. Evans, Garcia, Garcia, & Baron, 2003). Thus, we typically found higher levels of socially undesirable attitudes (e.g., racism) in our online samples than in comparable lab-based samples (cf. Evans, Garcia, Garcia, & Baron, 2003). This, we see no reason to believe that our online participants provided invalid data. Moreover, the results of Experiment 2, which was conducted in the lab, were replicated in Experiment 3, which was conducted online.

To ensure that our procedural strength manipulation successfully varied the perceived weight given to group membership in hiring, we administered the four policies, in random order, to each of 30 members (15 women and 15 men) of a private West Coast university’s online participation pool. Participants answered two randomly ordered questions about each policy: (a) “How much do you think this policy takes race into account in the hiring decision?” and (b) “How much do you think this policy takes individual merit into account in the hiring decision?” The second item was reverse coded such that higher scores reflect greater consideration of group membership. Participants made their ratings on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

We began our analysis of the pilot data by measuring the degree of association between our two manipulation check variables. Because the data were nested, with four pairs of observations per participant, we tested this relationship by using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) in HLM 6 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004). The two indicators of a policy’s emphasis on group membership were strongly positively related (B = 0.51, SE B = 0.08, r(29) = 6.18, p < .01; in terms of a Pearson correlation, the magnitude of the relationship was r(29) = .79. Given their high intercorrelation, we averaged the two indicators to form an aggregate measure of a policy’s emphasis on group membership in hiring (i.e., policy strength).

The HLM analyses reported in Experiment 1 assume that the four policy descriptions evoke different values on a continuous conceptual dimension—that is, policy strength. Such correlation-based statistical tests require that levels of a predictor constitute ordered, psychologically equidistant values. To evaluate whether our policy strength manipulation met these requirements, we tested its effect on the aggregate measure of policy strength by using repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The four policies differed significantly in terms of the perceived weight given to applicants’ group membership, F(3, 87) = 38.22, p < .01. As expected, stronger policies were seen to afford more consideration to group membership than were weaker policies (minimum qualifications: M = 4.78, SD = 1.56; tiebreak: M = 4.38, SD = 1.15; training: M = 3.15, SD = 1.11; outreach: M = 2.12, SD = 1.16). We then examined the degree to which various polynomial contrasts (i.e., linear, quadratic, and cubic) described the effect of policy type on policy strength. The linear contrast reached significance, F(1, 29) = 127.88, p < .01, whereas the quadratic, F(1, 29) = 3.92, p = .06, and cubic, F(1, 29) = 2.49, p = .12, contrasts did not. On the basis of these findings, we concluded that our

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1 To receive payment in Web-based studies, each participant was required to furnish us with an e-mail address. Participants were informed at the outset that their data would be encrypted and stored on a secure server and that their e-mail addresses and survey responses would be transmitted and saved in separate, unlinked files. These assurances, as well as the ease with which we were able to obtain anonymous e-mail addresses, suggest that our online participants were less sensitive to social desirability pressures than are participants who interact with experimenters in the lab. Consistent with this, we typically found higher levels of socially undesirable attitudes (e.g., racism) in our online samples than in comparable lab-based samples (cf. Evans, Garcia, Garcia, & Baron, 2003). Thus, we see no reason to believe that our online participants provided invalid data. Moreover, the results of Experiment 2, which was conducted in the lab, were replicated in Experiment 3, which was conducted online.
procedural strength manipulation had the intended effect of increasing the perceived weight given to racial group membership in hiring and that the intervals between levels of the variable were not significantly different from one another.

Experiment 1: Affirmative Action and Anticipated Group Outcomes

Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that concern for the ingroup’s outcomes determines Whites’ attitudes toward affirmative action, independent of the policy’s anticipated effect on the outgroup. We also sought to examine whether findings commonly taken to reflect Whites’ concern for justice—in particular, the finding that Whites oppose policies as a function of their procedural strength (i.e., weighting of group membership; Bobocel et al., 1998)—might instead reflect concern for in-group outcomes. Thus, we had participants read the descriptions of policies described in the pilot study; participants then rated how the policy would affect Whites, how the policy would affect minorities, and their level of support for the policy. This design allowed us to examine whether procedural strength affects expected group outcomes and, if so, whether these outcomes independently mediate the effect of strength on policy support.

Method

Participants

One hundred thirty-six White participants (93 women and 43 men) completed an online questionnaire containing study materials. Participants were recruited from an e-mail list maintained by a private West Coast university and were compensated with $5 gift certificates to an online retailer. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 62 years (M = 33.08 years, SD = 10.57 years), and educational attainment varied from 0 to 14 years of post-secondary education (M = 4.24 years, SD = 2.77 years).

Procedure

Participants received an e-mail inviting them to complete a Web-based survey of “Attitudes and Policy Views.” Participants accessed the survey by linking to a Web address provided in the recruitment e-mail. After linking to the Web page and giving informed consent, participants read descriptions of the four affirmative action hiring policies. Policy order was randomized. After each policy, participants were asked—in random order and on separate screens—how they expected the policy to affect Whites, how they expected the policy to affect minorities, and how much they would support the policy. After completing the questionnaire, participants were thanked and debriefed as to the nature of the study.

Procedural strength manipulation. Participants read descriptions of the four hiring policies described in the foregoing pilot study: (a) minimum qualifications, (b) tiebreak, (c) training, and (d) outreach.

Dependent measures. After reading each policy description, participants responded to three items. Two items assessed anticipated group outcomes: “How would this policy affect White applicants’ chances of being hired?” and “How would this policy affect minority applicants’ chances of being hired?” Participants made their ratings on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (greatly harm) to 7 (greatly improve), with no effect as the midpoint. The other item measured support for the policy: “How much do you oppose/support this policy compared to no policy at all?” Participants rated this item by using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support).

Results

We had several goals in the analyses that follow. First, we attempted to replicate the finding that stronger affirmative action procedures lead to greater opposition (Bobocel et al., 1998). Second, we examined whether different policies are associated with different expected outcomes for Whites and minorities. Third, we turned our attention to the relationship between expected White and minority outcomes and policy support—specifically testing our prediction that White outcomes influence support independent of minority outcomes. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that expected outcomes account, in part, for the relationship between procedural strength and support for affirmative action. Gender did not moderate any of the reported effects and is therefore not presented in the reported analyses.

Effects of Procedural Strength

Support. A within-subject ANOVA revealed that the policy manipulation significantly influenced policy support; inspection of means across policy types indicates that stronger policies garnered less support (see Table 1).

Expected outcomes. A within-subject ANOVA showed that policy type significantly influenced anticipated effects on Whites; the pattern of means reveals that stronger policies were expected to hurt Whites more than were weaker policies (see Table 1). Policy strength also significantly influenced anticipated outcomes for minorities, with stronger policies expected to benefit minorities more than were weaker policies (see Table 1). To ascertain the unique effect of procedural strength on White and minority outcomes, we used HLM 6 to test each effect while controlling for the other type of outcome. Results revealed that the procedural strength manipulation affected expected outcomes of Whites ($B = -0.52, SE B = 0.04, t(132) = -14.08, p < .01$, but not of minorities ($B = 0.01, SE B = 0.07, t(132) = 0.91, p = .36$), it appears that there is no reliable variation in anticipated minority outcomes once the effect of policy type on expected White outcomes is taken into account.

Expected Outcomes

Relationship between outcomes. To explore relationships between the expected outcomes of Whites and minorities, we analyzed the correlation between the anticipated outcomes separately

2 We sought to show that, consistent with the assumptions of the HLM analyses, our policy manipulation had a linear (rather than quadratic or cubic) effect on each outcome variable assessed in Experiment 1. As in the pilot study, this was assessed by using polynomial contrasts in repeated measures ANOVAs. The effect of the policy manipulation on anticipated White outcomes was strictly linear: The linear contrast was significant, $F(1, 134) = 272.26, p < .01$, whereas the quadratic contrast, $F(1, 134) = 0.74, p = .39$, and the cubic contrast, $F(1, 134) = 0.86, p = .34$, were not significant. Likewise, the effect of policy on anticipated minority outcomes was described by the linear contrast, $F(1, 135) = 7.62, p < .01$, better than by the quadratic contrast, $F(1, 135) = 2.68, p = .10$, or cubic contrast, $F(1, 135) = 3.82, p = .05$. Finally, a linear trend emerged only for the effect of policy type on support: The linear contrast was significant, $F(1, 134) = 152.62, p < .01$, whereas the quadratic contrast, $F(1, 134) = 0.29, p = .59$, and the cubic contrast, $F(1, 134) = 0.07, p = .79$, were not.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Outreach M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Training M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Tiebreak M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum qualification M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Policy effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy support</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>F(3, 402) = 61.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White outcome (benefit)</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>F(3, 402) = 86.65**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority outcome (benefit)</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>F(3, 405) = 5.34**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. t statistics are derived from hierarchical linear models in which the effect of procedural strength was allowed to vary randomly between participants. The effect of procedural strength on each type of outcome (i.e., White or minority) was tested while controlling for the other outcome’s effect.

** p < .01.

in each condition. Outcome expectations for Whites and minorities were negatively correlated in the minimum qualification condition, r(136) = −.24, p < .01; the tiebreak condition, r(136) = −.37, p < .01; and the training condition, r(136) = −.30, p < .01; but were not significantly associated in the outreach condition, r(136) = .08, p = .34.

Support. To test the hypothesis that expected outcomes predict policy support, we simultaneously regressed policy support on expected White outcomes and minority outcomes for each procedural strength condition. Consistent with the prediction that Whites are independently sensitive to their own group’s outcome, Whites’ expected outcome was significantly related to support in each policy condition. As shown in Table 2, the less the policy was perceived to harm Whites, the more participants supported it. Similarly, the expected outcome for minorities predicted support, albeit to a lesser extent in the outreach and training conditions, such that the more the policy benefited minorities, the more it was supported.

To more powerfully test the relationship between expected outcomes and policy support, we examined the association between within-participant variability in outcome ratings and policy support. (In contrast, the foregoing analysis made use only of between-subjects variation in expected outcomes.) Using HLM 6, we modeled the effect of White outcomes, minority outcomes, and the White Outcome × Minority Outcome interaction. To visualize this interaction, we plotted it according to procedures articulated by Aiken and West (1991).

Mediation Analysis

We next sought to test whether expected outcomes for Whites mediated the effect of procedural strength on policy support. Because expected outcomes for Whites were correlated with anticipated minority outcomes in some conditions, the mediating effect of White outcomes was tested while controlling for expected minority outcomes. As shown in Figure 2, the procedural strength manipulation predicted unique variance in expected outcomes for Whites. Supporting our hypothesis that expected outcomes may account for effects normally attributed to differences between procedures, the inclusion of anticipated White outcomes in the model reduced the effect of procedural strength on policy support. A Sobel test confirmed that this pattern of mediation was statistically significant (z = 6.91, p < .01). Minority outcomes did not, as noted above, vary as a function of policy strength and thus could not have mediated the relationship between policy strength and support.

3 For a thorough discussion of the evaluation of mediated models in the context of multilevel data structures, see Krull and MacKinnon (2001).
Discussion

Consistent with previous research (Bobocel et al., 1998; Kravitz, 1995; Nacoste, 1994a), Experiment 1 suggests that Whites’ opposition to affirmative action is in part a function of procedural strength—that is, the degree to which a policy weighs racial group membership in making a hiring decision. In addition, procedural strength influenced Whites’ expectations concerning the effect of affirmative action on fellow Whites’ chances of being hired. Most important, expected outcomes for Whites strongly predicted policy support—and, indeed, partially mediated the effect of procedural strength on support. We draw three conclusions from this pattern of results. First, Whites’ affirmative action attitudes are sensitive to White outcomes, irrespective of the policy’s effect on minorities. Second, affirmative action’s effect on Whites appears to be a more powerful determinant of White opposition than is the effect on minorities. However, it would be incorrect to assert that White participants entirely disregarded minority outcomes; rather, the interaction depicted in Figure 1 suggests that participants’ concern for the effect of affirmative action on Whites trumped their concern for the effect on minority group members. In other words, White participants were willing to consider whether a policy benefited minorities, but only after determining that the policy posed no threat to the White in-group. Consistent with this interpretation, as shown in Table 1, as procedural strength increased, the effect of minority outcomes on policy support decreased. From our perspective, this reflects a decline in the importance of minority outcomes as perceived harm to Whites increases. These findings are consistent with claims that in the post-Civil Rights era, pro-White bias is a more potent determinant of race-related attitudes than is anti-Black bias (Gaertner et al., 1997). Third, the effect of procedural strength on affirmative action attitudes—often taken as evidence for principled opposition—may in part be accounted for by expected outcomes for the White in-group.

**Alternative Interpretations**

In Experiment 1, Whites appeared willing to accept changes to the status quo—specifically, an alteration in the level of opportunity afforded to minorities—when they took their group’s interests to be safe. Hence, it appears that Whites’ attitudes toward affirmative action reflect their level of concern for the White in-group rather than for the extant social hierarchy. If White opposition to affirmative action were driven by system-justifying motives, participants would presumably have opposed policies perceived to hurt Whites or to help minorities, because both of these outcomes threaten the existing social order and suggest that the status quo is unjust. However, it may still be possible to argue that the large main effect of in-group outcomes on policy support represents concern for the dominant group rather than for the in-group per se. In this account, Whites’ desire to protect the White group reflects a concern for the dominant group, and by extension for the existing social system (Jost & Banaji, 1994), that is unrelated to their membership in that group. Similarly, the just-world hypothesis suggests that individuals may oppose a policy that harms the dominant group, regardless of their group membership, because such a policy implies that the current state of the world is unjust (Crosby, 2004; Lerner, 1980). Research also suggests that individuals may be reluctant to support policies perceived to harm one group in order to help another (J. Baron, 1995). As with system justification and the just-world hypothesis, the do-no-harm principle is group neutral; individuals’ desire to avoid doing harm is not tied to membership in the harmed group.

One way to disentangle these motives is to examine how a sense of psychological connection with the racial in-group affects Whites’ response to policies perceived to harm the White group. Concern for the status quo and desire to avoid doing harm should not depend on identification with the dominant group. In contrast, if opposition to affirmative action is driven by concern for the in-group, individuals should oppose a policy perceived to harm the group to the extent that they are in-group identified. Experiment 2 was designed to further explore whether individuals’ response to anticipated White outcomes reflects a concern for the in-group. Specifically, we assessed the effect of White racial identity—

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>t(132)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White outcome</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>10.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority outcome</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.66**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Outcome × Minority Outcome</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>6.78**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01.

Figure 1. Policy support as a function of anticipated group outcomes in Experiment 1.

Figure 2. Anticipated White outcomes mediating the relationship between procedural strength and policy support in Experiment 1. **p < .01.
Whites’ subjective tie to the in-group—on attitudes toward a policy perceived to harm Whites.

White Racial Identity

Research suggests that White racial identity may predict attitudes toward affirmative action (Arriola & Cole, 2001; Mack, Johnson, Green, Parisi, & Thomas, 2002). However, extant research on White identification defines racial identity as a progression through stages defined in large part by Whites, attitudes toward Blacks (Helms, 1995; Helms & Carter, 1991). This definition of White identity leaves open the possibility that prejudicedness, rather than a sense of connection to Whites, drives the observed effects of White racial identity. Consistent with this claim, research suggests that the most popular measure of White identity, the White Racial Identity Attitude Scale (Helms, 1995; Helms & Carter, 1991), may be a general measure of racism (Behrens, 1997; Behrens & Rowe, 1997; Rowe, Behrens, & Leach, 1995; Rowe, Bennett, & Atkinson, 1994).

In Experiment 2, we suggest that Whites’ affirmative action attitudes are driven by concern for the in-group per se rather than by concern for the dominant group or the general reluctance to do harm. We thus sought to isolate the effect of Whites’ psychological connection to their racial in-group on policy support. We posited that strongly identified Whites—those possessing a strong link between the self and racial in-group—will oppose a policy when the negative effect on the in-group is made salient. However, if White opposition to policies that harm the in-group stems entirely from a motive to justify the status quo or to avoid doing harm, racial identity should not moderate Whites’ response to such policies. Thus, findings in which support declines for a policy perceived to harm Whites as White racial identity increases would suggest that policy attitudes are driven by a concern for the in-group. Moreover, evidence that White identity does not affect Whites’ response to minority outcomes would add further support to the claim that concern for in-group outcomes is an independent source of intergroup discrimination. It is possible that White identity entails some degree of anti-Black prejudice, which increases opposition to affirmative action independent of how the outcome of the policy is framed. To examine this possibility, Experiment 2 includes a measure of anti-Black affect.

Experiment 2 was also designed to test the possibility that the effect of group interest on attitudes toward affirmative action may be experienced as a principled concern for fairness. Research suggests that individuals are motivated to believe that their group’s good fortune reflects the hard work, intelligence, or inherent worth of group members and is therefore deserved (Chen & Tyler, 2003; Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2004; Pettigrew, 1979). Thus, a policy that diminishes the resources available to the in-group is likely to be seen as unfair. Moreover, individuals may not be comfortable with the belief that their policy attitudes are driven by raw group interest. For these reasons, we hypothesized that perceived fairness would mediate the effect of group interest on attitudes toward affirmative action. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis by measuring perceptions of the target policies’ fairness.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, White participants completed a measure of White identity before rating support for an affirmative action policy described as having either a detrimental effect on White employees or a beneficial effect on Black employees. Participants were led to believe that the effect on Black and White employees was zero-sum, and specific outcomes were chosen such that the policy had the same effect across conditions. This experimental design allowed us to test the effect of psychological focus on Whites’ as opposed to Blacks’ outcomes while holding constant both the policy procedure and the policy’s outcome. We predicted that White racial identity would be negatively correlated with support for affirmative action when participants focused on a negative outcome for their group.

Method

Participants

Fifty-seven White undergraduates (35 women, 19 men, 3 gender not reported) from a private West Coast university completed study materials during a mass data collection session. They were compensated $20 for their participation.

Procedure

Participants were administered a questionnaire packet requiring a total of approximately 1 hr to complete. The present study consisted of two questionnaires separated by a number of unrelated surveys. In the first questionnaire, participants reported their attitude toward Blacks and their racial background and completed a measure of identification with their racial group. Later, in an ostensibly unrelated packet, participants read about a company and its affirmative action policy, reporting their degree of support for the policy and perceptions of the policy’s fairness.

Individual Difference Questionnaires

Anti-Black affect. Anti-Black affect was measured using a feeling thermometer. Participants were asked to indicate how warmly or coldly they felt toward Blacks and other ethnic groups on a scale from 0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm). To ensure that the emphasis on Blacks did not stand out, participants also rated Asian Americans, American Indians, and Mexican Americans. In the ensuing analyses, however, we focus only on participants’ affect toward Blacks. This item was reverse coded such that higher numbers indicate more negative feelings toward Blacks.

Racial identity. Participants were asked to classify themselves into one of five racial/ethnic groups: American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander, African American/Black, Caucasian/White, or Hispanic/Latino.

Immediately following this racial/ethnic self-categorization, participants were presented with a modified version of a racial identity centrality scale (Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997). The scale is a measure of “the extent to which a person normatively defines her or himself with regard to race” (Sellers et al., 1997, p. 806). Sellers and colleagues’ (1997) original items were designed to measure Black identity. Thus, to make the centrality scale applicable to Whites, we modified items to refer more generally to participants’ race. For example, the original item reading “My destiny is tied to the destiny of other Black people” was changed to “My destiny is tied to the destiny of people of my race.” This modified centrality scale demonstrated adequate interitem reliability (α = .77).
Policy Questionnaire

Outcome frame manipulation. The policy outcome manipulation was embedded in the description of a fictitious consulting firm, Strathmore International. Participants were presented with the following description about the company and its affirmative action policy:

Strathmore International is a consulting firm operating in the Midwestern United States. It specializes in facilitation of export financing, tourism development, and environmental management. The workforce at Strathmore International is primarily composed of Whites and Blacks.

Several years ago, an internal audit found that Strathmore’s hiring practices unfairly disadvantaged Blacks. To correct for this unintentional bias Strathmore adopted an affirmative action policy whereby extra efforts are made to get Blacks to apply for positions at the firm. This policy, however, does not consider ethnic group membership in the final selection decision.

Following this information, participants were randomly assigned to one of two outcome conditions. Specifically, the outcome was framed either as a rise in Black representation or a fall in White representation at Strathmore. Participants in the Black rise condition were presented with the following information:

Prior to the adoption of the affirmative action policy 5.3% of Strathmore’s employees were Black. In the years since the adoption of the affirmative action policy the percentage of Black employees has risen to 13.2%.

Alternatively, participants in the White fall condition read the following:

Prior to the adoption of the affirmative action policy 90.2% of Strathmore’s employees were White. In the years since the adoption of the affirmative action policy the percentage of White employees has fallen to 82.3%.

Because the demographic makeup of Strathmore’s workforce was described as primarily composed of Whites and Blacks, a rise in the percentage of Blacks implied a fall in the percentage of Whites and a fall in the percentage of Whites implied a rise in the percentage of Blacks. As such, regardless of how the outcome was framed, the net effect of the policy was the same in both conditions.

Dependent variables. After reading the description of Strathmore and its affirmative action policy, participants answered the following question: “How do you feel about Strathmore’s affirmative action policy?” (responses ranged from 1 = strongly oppose to 7 = strongly support). Participants were then asked, “How fair/unfair do you think Strathmore’s affirmative action policy is?” (responses ranged from 1 = not fair at all to 7 = very fair).

Results

Preliminary Analysis

Gender did not moderate any of the reported effects and is therefore not presented in the analyses to follow. To determine whether our data replicated basic findings in the literature and to get a sense of the nature of the racial identity measure, we examined the correlations among racial identity, anti-Black affect, policy support, and fairness (see Table 4). Three of these correlations deserve special attention. First, the correlation between racial identity and anti-Black affect was weak and not conventionally significant. Second, replicating previous findings and supporting the principled-objections argument, perceived policy fairness and support were positively related. Third, replicating research on the effects of racism and dominance motives, colder feelings toward Blacks were associated with less support for the policy.

Main Analyses

Policy support. We next tested the hypothesis that White racial identity would predict attitudes toward affirmative action only when individuals are focused on their own group’s outcome. We included anti-Black affect as a control in these analyses to ensure that it did not contribute to any observed effects of White racial identity or outcome frame. Following the procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991), we regressed policy support on anti-Black affect, White racial identity, outcome frame, and the White Racial Identity × Outcome Frame interaction (see Table 5). Consistent with previous studies, anti-Black affect was negatively related to support for the policy. However, support did not depend on whether the policy was described as increasing Black representation or decreasing White representation. We also did not observe a significant main effect of racial identity. More important, we observed a significant interaction between racial identity and outcome frame. As seen in Figure 3, this interaction reflects the fact that racial identity predicted attitudes toward affirmative action when individuals were focused on their own group’s outcome but not when focused on minority outcomes. Simple slope analyses revealed that racial identity was negatively related to support for the policy when its outcome was framed as a fall in Whites’ representation (B = −0.59, SE B = 0.22, β = −.44), t(29) = 2.64, p < .05. In contrast, racial identity did not predict support for the policy in the Black rise condition (B = 0.22, SE B = 0.27, β = .16), t(23) = 0.80, p = .43.

Perceived fairness. The analyses conducted on policy support were repeated for perceptions of policy fairness (see Table 6). Anti-Black affect was not significantly related to perceived fairness. However, the remaining effects replicated those obtained for policy support. Racial identity was negatively related to fairness, and perceived fairness did not depend on whether the policy was described as increasing Black representation or decreasing White representation. There was also a significant interaction between racial identity and outcome frame, such that racial identity was negatively related to perceived fairness when the outcome was framed as a fall in Whites’ representation (B = −0.82, SE B = 0.29, β = −.50), t(29) = 2.84, p < .01, but not when framed as an increase in Blacks’ representation (B = 0.27, SE B = 0.34, β = .16), t(23) = .78, p = .44.

Mediation analyses. The results reported thus far are consistent with the possibility that perceived fairness mediates the interactive effect of outcome frame and racial identity on policy support. As reported in the preliminary analyses, there was a strong

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1. Racial identity</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anti-Black affect</td>
<td>35.43</td>
<td>19.74</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Policy support</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>−.22†</td>
<td>−.35**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Perceived fairness</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>−.21†</td>
<td>−.25†</td>
<td>.67**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† p < .10. ** p < .01.
relationship between policy support and perceived fairness, and the Outcome Frame × Racial Identity interaction term predicted both perceived fairness and policy support. To test the final component of the mediation hypothesis (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986), we regressed policy support on both the Outcome Frame of the mediation hypothesis (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986), we regressed policy support on both the Outcome Frame and perceived fairness and relevant main effects. As shown in Figure 4, including perceived fairness in the model rendered the effect of the Racial Identity × Outcome Frame interaction nonsignificant. A Sobel test indicated that the drop in the interaction term’s direct effect on policy support was significant (z = 2.07, p < .05).

Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that Whites’ responses to their group’s outcomes reflect a concern for the in-group per se. Specifically, the more Whites identified with their racial group, the more they opposed a policy said to harm their group. Moreover, providing evidence that individuals separate in-group and out-group outcomes, White racial identity did not predict support for a policy said to benefit Blacks. This result also suggests that White attitudes toward the policy were driven by concern for the group’s material interests rather than for their relative standing in the social hierarchy. If Whites were concerned with their social standing, White racial identity should have predicted attitudes toward the policy in both the White fall and the Black rise conditions, as both affect their relative social position.

The fact that White identity predicted policy support only when White outcomes were emphasized suggests that Whites are specifically sensitive to their group’s outcomes. However, this effect might also simply reflect Whites’ negative response to any mention of White outcomes. That is, even if the policy had no effect on White employment at Strathmore, the mere mention of Whites in connection with affirmative action could have engendered a negative relationship between White racial identity and policy support. The next experiment was designed to rule out this possibility. Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2, except for the addition of a condition in which Whites were said to be unaffected by White outcomes, then we should observe no such relationship when the policy is said to have no effect on Whites.

Experiment 3

Method
Participants
Two hundred four participants (134 women and 70 men) completed an online questionnaire containing study materials. Participants were recruited from an e-mail list maintained by a private West Coast university and were compensated with $5 gift certificates to an online retailer. Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 68 years (M = 35.80 years, SD = 11.42 years), and educational attainment varied from 0 to 15 years of post-secondary education (M = 4.12 years, SD = 2.65 years).

Procedure
The current procedure closely paralleled that of Experiment 2. The only differences were the addition of an experimental condition (described below) and the omission of the thermometer measure of anti-Black affect.

Figure 3. Policy support as a function of racial identity and outcome frame in Experiment 2.

Figure 4. Perceived fairness mediating the interactive effect of racial identity and outcome frame (White fall vs. Black rise) on policy support in Experiment 2. *p < .05. **p < .01.
White Racial Identity

White racial identity was assessed by using the same modified items (Sellers et al., 1997) reported in Experiment 2. The scale exhibited good internal reliability ($\alpha = .82$).

Policy Questionnaire

Outcome frame manipulation. We administered the same outcome frame manipulation as in Experiment 2, with the addition of one condition. In the White unchanged condition, the Strathmore policy description included the following outcome description: “Prior to the adoption of the affirmative action policy, 90.2% of Strathmore’s employees were White. In the years since the adoption of the affirmative action policy, the percentage of White employees has remained the same, at 90.2%.” Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the resulting three policy conditions (i.e., White fall, Black rise, and White unchanged).

Dependent variables. Policy support and perceived fairness were measured by using the same items as described in Experiment 2.

Results

Preliminary Analysis

Gender did not moderate any of the reported effects and is therefore not presented in the reported analyses. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among racial identity, policy support, and perceived fairness are presented in Table 7.

Main Analyses

Policy support. In the current study, we predicted that White racial identity would be negatively associated with support for affirmative action in the White fall condition, but not in the Black rise or White unchanged conditions. We evaluated this hypothesis by testing interactions involving outcome frame and racial identity. More specifically, we ran planned contrasts representing the degree to which the relationship between racial identity and policy support changed across the three outcome frame conditions (see Aiken & West, 1991). We began by choosing White fall as the necessary baseline condition. We next created two dummy variables comparing the Black rise and White unchanged conditions with the White fall baseline. Finally, we regressed policy support on the Black rise contrast, White unchanged contrast, mean-centered racial identity, and the Black Rise $\times$ Racial Identity and White Unchanged $\times$ Racial Identity interactions. Table 8 displays the results of this analysis. The significant Black Rise $\times$ Racial Identity interaction indicates that—as in Experiment 2—identity had a different effect on policy support in the Black rise condition than in the White fall baseline. Likewise, the marginally significant White Unchanged $\times$ Racial Identity interaction suggests that the relationship between identity and support differed between the White unchanged and White fall conditions.

To visualize these effects, we plotted them in accordance with Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations. As can be seen in Figure 5, only in the White fall condition did racial identity predict policy support. Analysis of simple effects confirmed that racial identity was significantly correlated with support in the White fall condition, $r(62) = -.28$, $p < .05$, but not in the Black rise condition, $r(88) = .05$, $p = .68$, or White unchanged condition, $r(54) = .02$, $p = .86$. Together, these findings suggest that racial identity was related to support for affirmative action only when participants were focused on their own group’s negative outcome.

Perceived fairness. The contrast analysis conducted on policy support was repeated for perceptions of fairness as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 9, we observed a marginally significant interaction between the Black rise contrast and White racial identity, creating the possibility that perceived fairness mediated the effect of the Black Rise $\times$ Racial Identity interaction on policy support. The final component of the mediation test was conducted by simultaneously regressing policy support on the effects depicted in Table 8 as well as on perceived fairness (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986). In this analysis, the effect of the Black Rise $\times$ Racial Identity interaction fell below conventional significance, whereas the effect of perceived fairness on policy support remained strong (Figure 6A). A Sobel test indicated that perceived fairness was a marginally significant mediator of the Black Rise $\times$ Racial Identity interaction on policy support ($z = 1.84, p = .07$).

To further explore the role of perceived fairness in mediating the effects of White racial identity on policy support, we conducted a mediational analysis (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986) within the White fall condition alone. In this condition, racial identity was negatively correlated with perceptions of the policy’s fairness. Fairness, in turn, was a strong predictor of support for the policy. Suggesting partial mediation, the inclusion of perceived fairness in the model largely eliminated the direct effect of racial identity on policy support (Figure 6B). Significant mediation was confirmed by a Sobel test ($z = 2.74, p < .01$). Taken together, our mediation analyses suggest that Whites experienced their attitudes toward affirmative action policy as driven by race-neutral appraisals of the policy’s fairness.

General Discussion

The experiments reported here provide evidence that the effect of Whites’ concern for their own group’s outcomes can be separated from the effect of their concern for the outcomes of minority groups. In Experiment 1, how Whites thought a policy would affect their group influenced their support for the policy, even after controlling for the policy’s effect on minorities. In Experiments 2 and 3, when a policy’s outcome was framed in terms of White loss, racial identity was negatively related to support for the policy. In contrast, when the outcome was framed in terms of Black gain or when there was no change in White representation, there was no relationship between racial identity and support for the policy.

These findings suggest that concern for one’s own group and concern for other groups can independently affect policy attitudes. Moreover, the moderating role of White racial identity strongly suggests that the effect of White outcomes cannot be entirely explained by group-neutral motives, such as system justification or
the do-no-harm principle. However, it should be noted that the Racial Identity Centrality Scale used in Experiments 2 and 3 has been validated only with African American participants (Sellers et al., 1997). Thus, although the scale demonstrated high internal reliability in our samples, future research should more fully explore the scale’s properties among White Americans.

Although one might have expected individuals to oppose a policy said to decrease the representation of Whites more than a policy said to increase the representation of Blacks, neither Experiment 2 nor 3 produced evidence of such a main effect. We suggest that this may have occurred because the effect of outcome frame—White fall versus Black rise—is likely subject to a great many influences. For example, it is possible that attitudes toward Blacks not captured by the explicit measure of anti-Black affect used in Experiment 2, such as symbolic racism or implicit racism, depressed participants’ support of the policy said to help Blacks but did not affect support for policies said to harm Whites. It is important to note that the null main effect of outcome frame does not affect the interpretation of the observed interaction between White racial identity and outcome frame.

In Experiments 2 and 3, the interaction between White racial identity and outcome frame on policy support was mediated by perceived fairness. This suggests that individuals might not experience their opposition as driven by the policy’s outcome per se. Instead, policy outcomes may affect individual’s perceptions of fairness, which in turn affect their support for the policy. On one hand, this finding is discouraging. It suggests that individuals may feel righteous in their opposition to affirmative action, even when their attitudes are driven by their concern for an already privileged group’s outcomes. On the other hand, this mediation suggests that if individuals can be convinced that a policy is fair, they may be willing to support it even if it harms their group.

**Implications for Theories of Intergroup Conflict**

It has been argued that the debate surrounding affirmative action is so fierce because of its zero-sum nature: Increased opportunity for one group necessarily means decreased opportunity for other groups (Thurow, 1987). Although it may be true that the distribution of desired jobs among racial groups is zero-sum, the experiments reported here suggest that individuals do not always experience the situation in this way. The present findings also suggest that defining opposition as driven by either dominance motives, racism, or principled objections may be too restrictive. The effect of concern for one’s own group does not fit neatly into any of these categories. Whites who oppose affirmative action to protect their group’s interests are not necessarily interested in harming minorities or maximizing their position relative to minority groups. However, concern for one’s own group’s outcome is certainly not principled, at least not in the way that the term is commonly understood.

Although the reported experiments suggest that majority group members may not experience concern for resources as a zero-sum competition, our findings support claims that outcomes affect Whites’ attitudes toward affirmative action. As many dominance-motive theorists might expect, White outcomes predicted White participants’ attitudes toward affirmative action. However, contrary to most dominance perspectives, these responses were not mirrored by reactions to minority outcomes. When the policy did not harm Whites, participants supported policies that benefited minorities. Whites’ preoccupation with not harming the in-group, however, may create a situation in which the benefits provided to minorities by strong policies do not increase support because these

### Table 8

**Contrast Analysis Probing the Effect of Racial Identity on Policy Support Across the Three Outcome Frame Conditions (White Fall, Black Rise, and White Unchanged) in Experiment 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>t(180)</th>
<th>β</th>
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<tr>
<td>Black rise contrast</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White unchanged contrast</td>
<td>−0.20</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>−0.62</td>
<td>−.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial identity</td>
<td>−0.52</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>−2.37*</td>
<td>−.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Rise Contrast × Racial Identity</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.10*</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Unchanged Contrast × Racial Identity</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.68*</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. The Black rise contrast variable compares the Black rise condition with the White fall comparison condition. The White unchanged contrast variable, in turn, compares the White unchanged condition with the White unchanged baseline. Thus, interactions involving these variables and racial identity indicate that the effect of identity in the Black rise or White unchanged conditions diverges from that in the White fall baseline condition.

*p < .09.

*p < .05.

![Figure 5](Image)

**Figure 5.** Policy support as a function of racial identity and outcome frame in Experiment 3.
policies are perceived as causing harm to the in-group. As such, the policies most likely to create diverse workforces—that is, the policies most likely to benefit minorities—are also the ones most likely to be opposed.

Whites’ concern for their racial group’s outcomes poses a special problem for the principled-objections perspective. This perspective typically focuses on features of affirmative action that appear to violate particular principles. However, if differences in procedure produce different expected outcomes, then the effects of procedure manipulations may reflect a concern for outcomes. Moreover, many of the effects commonly taken to support the principled-objections argument also happen to be consistent with the possibility that individuals are protecting their group’s interests.

Research suggests that the more people care about principles like merit, the more they oppose stronger policy procedures; it is rare to see such concerns work in favor of minority groups. For example, a stronger belief in the principle of merit does not increase support for affirmative action, a policy that could restore the balance necessary for a meritocracy, even when individuals acknowledge the existence of racial discrimination (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002). This allows for the possibility that the preference for merit is strategically invoked to protect the majority group’s interests. Consistent with this possibility, there is reason to believe that individual differences in support for principles like merit may be related to other beliefs that are self-servingly sensitive to a policy’s outcome. For example, recent work suggests that valuing merit may cause members of the dominant group to avoid acknowledging racial privilege in an effort to increase their own sense of deservingness. This self-serving denial of privilege may in turn reduce support for policies like affirmative action (Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2004). Of course, this by no means proves that what appears to be a principled objection always masks less noble motives, but it does suggest that more stringent criteria may be needed to assess the scope of truly principled opposition to affirmative action.

Despite the large number of studies demonstrating that social identity exerts a strong influence on intergroup behavior, there is relatively little research examining how White racial identity affects the attitudes of White Americans. Consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the reported studies demonstrate that the more Whites identify with their group, the more they protect the resources of the in-group. It is interesting to note, however, that White racial identity did not affect Whites’ response to policies that reduced their relative standing by helping minority.

This finding runs counter to social identity theory’s early formulations—which posited that intergroup comparison and positive in-group distinctiveness drive attitudes—but is quite consistent with more recent research on social identity (e.g., Brewer, 1999) that suggests the primacy of in-group favoritism. More important, the reported studies highlight the point that a full understanding of intergroup relations among real groups requires us to explore the meaning and nature of dominant-group identity. In the domain of race, this requires us to acknowledge that Whites are racial actors and to explore how their racial identity affects race-relevant attitudes and behaviors.

**Conclusion**

The present studies suggest that even if all members of society successfully purged themselves of prejudice, full inclusion of minority group members in society may still be hindered by malice-free attempts to maintain the privileges that dominant-group members have grown to see as their due. The elimination of such barriers requires an exploration of what we suspect is a complex collection of material and psychological privileges that, once experienced, result in what has been referred to as a “pos-

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**Table 9**

*Contrast Analysis Probing the Effect of Racial Identity on Perceived Fairness Across the Three Outcome Frame Conditions (White Fall, Black Rise, and White Unchanged) in Experiment 3*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Predictor</th>
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<tr>
<td>White unchanged contrast</td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<td>−.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Rise Contrast × Racial Identity</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Unchanged Contrast × Racial Identity</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* p = .07.
* p < .05.

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**Figure 6.**

A: Perceived fairness mediating the interactive effect of racial identity and outcome frame (White fall vs. Black rise) on policy support in Experiment 3. B: Perceived fairness mediating the effect of racial identity on policy support in the White fall outcome frame condition. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
cessive investment in Whiteness” (Lipsitz, 1998, p. 2). Thus, social justice requires more than the elimination of prejudice against the stigmatized. To fully contribute to the creation of a just society, members of the dominant group must also cease to use their dominant position to protect and enhance privileges associated with their group membership.

References
of self-interest, racial affect, and stratification beliefs on Whites' views. Social Forces, 61, 797–824.


