

# Secure and Resilient Distributed Machine Learning Algorithms Under Adversarial Environment

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# Motivations

Machine learning algorithms are widely used.

They are vulnerable to attackers who can create “misleading” data.

Distributed algorithms are developed to solve large-scale problems.

However, the system becomes more vulnerable.

- Enlarge attack surface.
- Network effects.


## Objective of the talk

We study secure and resilient distributed machine learning algorithms under adversarial environment.

- Nilesch Dalvi, Pedro Domingos, Sumit Sanghai, and Deepak Verma. Adversarial classification. *Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining*, pp. 99-108. ACM, 2004.
- Wei Liu, and Sanjay Chawla. A game theoretical model for adversarial learning. *Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Workshops*, pp. 25-30. IEEE, 2009.
- Marco Barreno, Blaine Nelson, Anthony Joseph, and Doug Tygar. The security of machine learning. *Machine Learning* pp. 121-148. 2010.

# Distributed Support Vector Machines


## Introduction to Support Vector Machines (SVMs)



- SVMs are supervised learning models used for classification.
- The goal is to find the hyperplane with largest margins between different sets of samples [Cortes and Vapnik, 1995].


# Distributed Support Vector Machines

## Introduction to Support Vector Machines (SVMs)




$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\mathbf{w}} \quad & \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{w}\|^2 \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & y_i (\mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i + b) \geq 1, \quad i = 1, \dots, N. \end{aligned}$$

# Distributed Support Vector Machines




$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\mathbf{w}, \{\xi_i\}} \quad & \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbf{w}\|^2 + C \sum_{i=1}^N \xi_i \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & y_i (\mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i + b) \geq 1 - \xi_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N; \\ & \xi_i \geq 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, N. \end{aligned}$$

# Distributed Support Vector Machines



- A network consists of 4 nodes.
- Nodes can communicate with their neighbors.
- Nodes do not have to be fully connected.

# Distributed Support Vector Machines




- Each node contains a labeled training set

$$\mathcal{D}_v := \{(\mathbf{x}_{vn}, y_{vn}) : n = 1, \dots, N_v\}.$$

- $\mathbf{x}_{vn}$  is the  $n$ -th data in node  $v$ .
- $y_{vn}$  is the label of  $n$ -th data in node  $v$ .




# Distributed Support Vector Machines



- Pedro A. Forero, Alfonso Cano, and Georgios B. Giannakis. Consensus-based distributed support vector machines. *The Journal of Machine Learning Research* 11 (2010): 1663-1707.


# Distributed Support Vector Machines



$$\min_{\{\mathbf{w}_v, b_v, \{\xi_{vn}\}\}} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \|\mathbf{w}_v\|^2 + VC_I \sum_{v=1}^V \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \xi_{vn}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{s.t.} \quad & y_{vn}(\mathbf{w}_v^T \mathbf{x}_{vn} + b_v) \geq 1 - \xi_{vn}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, n = 1, \dots, N_v; \\ & \xi_{vn} \geq 0, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, n = 1, \dots, N_v; \\ & \mathbf{w}_v = \mathbf{w}_u, b_v = b_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, u \in \mathcal{B}_v. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$


# Distributed Support Vector Machines



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
# Distributed Support Vector Machines



$$\min_{\{w_v, b_v\}} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \|w_v\|^2 + VC_l \sum_{v=1}^V \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} [1 - y_{vn}(w_v^T x_{vn} + b_v)]_+ \quad (2)$$

$$\text{s.t. } w_v = w_u, \quad b_v = b_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, u \in B_v.$$

# Problem Statement: Overview



- Each node contains a labeled training set  $\mathcal{D}_v := \{(\mathbf{x}_{vn}, y_{vn}) : n = 1, \dots, N_v\}$ .
- Node 4 can communicate with its 4 neighbors. An attacker can take over a subset of the nodes.

## System Model

- Aim of Learner: High Accuracy
- Aim of Attacker: Low Accuracy

## Attack Model

- Attacker knows learning algorithm.
- Attacker can take over a set of nodes.
- Attacker can modify the training data.

## A game between a learner and an attacker

# Problem Statement: Mathematical Model

## Mathematical Model for Learner

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\{\mathbf{w}_v, b_v\}} & \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \|\mathbf{w}_v\|^2}_{(a)} + \underbrace{V_l C_l \sum_{v=1}^{V_l} \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \left[ 1 - y_{vn} (\mathbf{w}_v^T \mathbf{x}_{vn} + b_v) \right]_+}_{(b)} \\ & + \underbrace{V_a C_l \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \left[ 1 - y_{vn} (\mathbf{w}_v^T \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{vn} + b_v) \right]_+}_{(c)} \quad (3) \\ \text{s.t.} & \quad \mathbf{w}_v = \mathbf{w}_u, \quad b_v = b_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, u \in \mathcal{B}_v. \end{aligned}$$

- Term (a) is the sum of inverse of the distance of margin.
- Term (b) is the error penalty of nodes without attack.
- Term (c) is the error penalty of nodes under attack.
- $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{vn}$  represents data modified by the attacker.

# Problem Statement: Mathematical Model

## Mathematical Model for Learner

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## Mathematical Model for the Attacker

- The attacker changes  $\mathbf{x}_{vn}$  into  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{vn} = \mathbf{x}_{vn} - \delta_{vn}$ , where  $\{\delta_{vn}\} \in \mathcal{U}$ , and  $\mathcal{U}$  is the attacker's action set [Xu et al., 2009].
- Here

$$\mathcal{U} = \left\{ (\delta_{v1}, \delta_{v2}, \dots, \delta_{vN_v}) \mid \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \|\delta_{vn}\| \leq C_\delta \right\}$$

- Also we introduce

$$\mathcal{U}_0 = \{\delta_v \mid \|\delta_v\| \leq C_\delta\}$$

- Notice that  $C_\delta$  does not have to be same in different nodes.

# Problem Statement: Mathematical Model

## Mathematical Model for Attacker

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{\delta_{vn}\}} & \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \|\mathbf{w}_v\|^2}_{(a)} + \underbrace{V_l C_l \sum_{v=1}^{V_l} \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \left[ 1 - y_{vn} (\mathbf{w}_v^T \mathbf{x}_{vn} + b_v) \right]_+}_{(b)} \\ & + \underbrace{V_a C_l \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \left[ 1 - y_{vn} (\mathbf{w}_v^T (\mathbf{x}_{vn} - \delta_{vn}) + b_v) \right]_+}_{(c)} - \underbrace{C_a \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \|\delta_{vn}\|_0}_{(d)} \\ \text{s.t. } & (\delta_{v1}, \dots, \delta_{vN_v}) \in \mathcal{U}_v, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a. \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

- Terms (a)(b)(c) are the objectives of the learner's min-problem.
- Term (d) is the cost function for the attacker.
- $l_0$  norm is a total number of nonzero elements in a vector.

# Problem Statement: Mathematical Model

## Mathematical Model for Attacker

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$$\text{s.t. } (\delta_{v1}, \dots, \delta_{vN_v}) \in \mathcal{U}_v, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a.$$

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# Mathematical Model: Min-Max Problem

$$\begin{aligned}
 \min_{\{\mathbf{w}_v, b_v\}} \max_{\{\delta_{vn}\}} & \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \|\mathbf{w}_v\|^2}_{(a)} + \underbrace{V_l C_l \sum_{v=1}^{V_l} \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \left[ 1 - y_{vn} (\mathbf{w}_v^T \mathbf{x}_{vn} + b_v) \right]_+}_{(b)} \\
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 \text{s.t.} \quad & \mathbf{w}_v = \mathbf{w}_u, b_v = b_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, u \in \mathcal{B}_v; \\
 & (\delta_{v1}, \dots, \delta_{vN_v}) \in \mathcal{U}_v, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a.
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

- Terms (a)(b)(c) are related to the min-problem for the learner.
- Terms (a)(b)(c)(d) are related to the max-problem for the attacker.
- A nonzero-sum game.



# Mathematical Model: Min-Max Problem

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 \min_{\{\mathbf{w}_v, b_v\}} \max_{\{\delta_{vn}\}} & \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \|\mathbf{w}_v\|^2}_{(a)} + \underbrace{V_l C_l \sum_{v=1}^{V_l} \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \left[ 1 - y_{vn} (\mathbf{w}_v^T \mathbf{x}_{vn} + b_v) \right]_+}_{(b)} \\
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$$\text{s.t.} \quad \mathbf{w}_v = \mathbf{w}_u, b_v = b_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, u \in \mathcal{B}_v; \\
 (\delta_{v1}, \dots, \delta_{vN_v}) \in \mathcal{U}_v, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a.$$

- Terms (c)(d) can be simplified further by using the definition of  $\mathcal{U}_v$  and  $\mathcal{U}_{v0}$ .

# Solutions and Algorithms: Proposition 1

With  $\mathcal{U}_v = \left\{ (\delta_{v1}, \dots, \delta_{vN_v}) \mid \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \|\delta_{vn}\| \leq C_\delta \right\}$  and  $\mathcal{U}_{v0} = \{\delta_v \mid \|\delta_v\| \leq C_\delta\}$ , the min-max problem is equivalent to the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \min_{\{\mathbf{w}_v, b_v\}} \max_{\{\delta_{vn}\}} & \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \|\mathbf{w}_v\|^2}_{(a)} + \underbrace{VC_I \sum_{v=1}^V \sum_{n=1}^{N_v} \left[ 1 - y_{vn}(\mathbf{w}_v^T \mathbf{x}_{vn} + b_v) \right]_+}_{(b)} \\
 & + \underbrace{V_a C_I \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \mathbf{w}_v^T \delta_v}_{(c)} - \underbrace{C_a \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \|\delta_v\|_0}_{(d)}, \tag{6}
 \end{aligned}$$

s.t.  $\mathbf{w}_v = \mathbf{w}_u, b_v = b_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, u \in \mathcal{B}_v;$   
 $\delta_v \in \mathcal{U}_{v0}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a.$

# Solutions and Algorithms: Problem Reformulation

- Decision variables space  $\mathbf{r}_v := [\mathbf{w}_v^T, b_v]^T$ ,
- Augmented matrix  $\mathbf{X}_v := [(\mathbf{x}_{v1}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{vN_v})^T, \mathbf{1}_v]$ ,
- Diagonal label matrix  $\mathbf{Y}_v := \text{diag}([y_{v1}, \dots, y_{vN_v}])$ .
- Note that  $\mathbf{w}_v = (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1})\mathbf{r}_v$ , where  $\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}$  is a  $(p+1) \times (p+1)$  identity matrix with 0 at  $(p+1, p+1)$ -st entry.

Thus, problem (6) can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\{\mathbf{r}_v, \omega_{vu}\}} \max_{\{\delta_v\}} & \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \mathbf{r}_v + VC_l \sum_{v=1}^V [\mathbf{1}_v - \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{r}_v]_+ \\ & + V_a C_l \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v - C_a \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \|\delta_v\|_0 \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

s.t.  $\mathbf{r}_v = \omega_{vu}, \omega_{vu} = \mathbf{r}_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, \forall u \in \mathcal{B}_v;$   
 $\delta_v \in \mathcal{U}_{v0}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a.$

# Solutions and Algorithms: Problem Reformulation

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\{\mathbf{r}_v, \omega_{vu}\}} \max_{\{\delta_v\}} & \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \mathbf{r}_v}_{(a)} + \underbrace{V C_I \sum_{v=1}^V [\mathbf{1}_v - \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{r}_v]_+}_{(b)} \\ & + \underbrace{V_a C_I \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v}_{(c)} - \underbrace{C_a \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \|\delta_v\|_0}_{(d)} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \mathbf{r}_v = \omega_{vu}, \omega_{vu} = \mathbf{r}_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, \forall u \in \mathcal{B}_v; \\ & \delta_v \in \mathcal{U}_{v0}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a. \end{aligned}$$

- Terms (c)(d) are related to the max-problem.
- Terms (a)(b)(c) are related to the min-problem.
- A zero-sum game.

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# Construct Min-Problem and Max-Problem

- To solve the min-max problem, we use **best response dynamics** to construct the best response for the min-problem and max-problem separately.
- For fixed  $\{\mathbf{r}_v^*\}$ , the max-problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{\delta_v\}} & \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \left( V_a C_l \mathbf{r}_v^{*T} (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v - C_a \|\delta_v\|_0 \right) \\ \text{s.t.} & \delta_v \in \mathcal{U}_{v0}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

- For a fixed  $\{\delta_v^*\}$ , the min-problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\{\mathbf{r}_v, \omega_{vu}\}} & \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \mathbf{r}_v + V C_l \sum_{v=1}^V [\mathbf{1}_v - \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{r}_v]_+ \\ & + \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} V_a C_l \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v^* \\ \text{s.t.} & \mathbf{r}_v = \omega_{vu}, \omega_{vu} = \mathbf{r}_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, \forall u \in \mathcal{B}_v. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$



## The Max-Problem

For fixed  $\{\mathbf{r}_v^*, \delta\}$ , the max-problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{\delta_v\}} \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} \left( V_a C_l \mathbf{r}_v^{*T} (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v - C_a \|\delta_v\|_0 \right) \\ \text{s.t. } \delta_v \in \mathcal{U}_{v0}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

## Solutions to the Max-Problem

We relax  $l_0$  norm to  $l_1$  norm to represent the cost function of the attacker. By writing the dual form of the  $l_1$  norm, we arrive at

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{\delta_v, s_v\}} V_a C_l \mathbf{r}_v^{*T} (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v - \mathbf{1}^T s_v \\ \text{s.t. } C_a \delta_v \leq s_v, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a; \\ C_a \delta_v \geq -s_v, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a; \\ \delta_v \in \mathcal{U}_{v0}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

## The Max-Problem

For fixed  $\{\mathbf{r}_v^*, \delta\}$ , the max-problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{\delta_v\}} \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} & \left( V_a C_l \mathbf{r}_v^{*T} (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v - C_a \|\delta_v\|_0 \right) \\ \text{s.t. } & \delta_v \in \mathcal{U}_{v0}, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a. \end{aligned}$$

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## The Min-Problem

For fixed  $\{\delta_v^*\}$ , the min-problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\{\mathbf{r}_v, \xi_v, \omega_{vu}\}} & \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v=1}^V \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \mathbf{r}_v + VC_l \sum_{v=1}^V [\mathbf{1}_v - \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{r}_v]_+ \\ & + \sum_{v=1}^{V_a} V_a C_l \mathbf{r}_v^T (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v^* \\ \text{s.t.} & \quad \mathbf{r}_v = \omega_{vu}, \omega_{vu} = \mathbf{r}_u, \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, \forall u \in \mathcal{B}_u. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

## Solution to the Min-Problem

We use the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMoM).

# ADMoM for the Min-Problem

ADMoM is a distributed optimization algorithm [Boyd et al.,2010].

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\{\mathbf{r}_v, \omega\}} \quad & \sum_{v=1}^V f_v(\mathbf{r}_v) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \mathbf{r}_v - \omega = 0, \quad v = 1, \dots, V. \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

where  $f_v$  are convex functions.

With  $\alpha_v$  denotes the Lagrange multipliers, the ADMoM solves problem (13) by the update rules below:

$$\mathbf{r}_v(t+1) \in \arg \min_{\mathbf{r}_v \in \mathcal{P}_1} f_v(\mathbf{r}_v) + \alpha_v^T (\mathbf{r}_v - \omega) + \frac{\eta}{2} \|\mathbf{r}_v - \omega\|^2. \quad (14)$$

$$\omega(t+1) \in \arg \min_{\omega \in \mathcal{P}_2} \sum_{v=1}^V f_v(\mathbf{r}_v) + \alpha_v^T (\mathbf{r}_v - \omega) + \frac{\eta}{2} \|\mathbf{r}_v - \omega\|^2. \quad (15)$$

$$\alpha_v(t+1) = \alpha_v(t) + \eta(\mathbf{r}_v(t+1) - \omega(t+1)). \quad (16)$$

# Solutions to the Min-Problem

- Apply ADMoM to the Min-Problem, and use iterative methods to find solutions.

**Lemma** Each node iterates  $\lambda_v(t)$ ,  $\mathbf{r}_v(t)$  and  $\alpha_v(t)$ , given by

$$\lambda_v(t+1) \in \arg \max_{\mathbf{0} \leq \lambda_v \leq V C_l \mathbf{1}_v} -\frac{1}{2} \lambda_v^T \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{U}_v^{-1} \mathbf{X}_v^T \mathbf{Y}_v \lambda_v + (\mathbf{1}_v + \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{U}_v^{-1} \mathbf{f}_v(t))^T \lambda_v, \quad (17)$$



$$\mathbf{r}_v(t+1) = \mathbf{U}_v^{-1} \left( \mathbf{X}_v^T \mathbf{Y}_v \lambda_v(t+1) - \mathbf{f}_v(t) \right), \quad (18)$$

$$\alpha_v(t+1) = \alpha_v(t) + \frac{\eta}{2} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{B}_v} [\mathbf{r}_v(t+1) - \mathbf{r}_u(t+1)], \quad (19)$$



- $\mathbf{U}_v = (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) + 2\eta |\mathcal{B}_v| \mathbf{I}_{p+1}$
- $\mathbf{f}_v(t) = V_a C_l \delta_v^* + 2\alpha_v(t) - \eta \sum_{u \in \mathcal{B}_v} (\mathbf{r}_v(t) + \mathbf{r}_u(t)), \eta > 0.$

# Secure and Resilient Algorithms

- Combine the solutions of Max-Problem with the solutions of Min-Problem.





# Algorithms: Step 1 Each Node Computes $\delta_v$



$$\delta_v(t+1) \in \arg \max_{\{\delta_v, s_v\}} V_a C_l r_v^T(t) (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) \delta_v - \mathbf{1}^T s_v$$
$$\text{s.t. } \begin{aligned} C_a \delta_v &\leq s_v, & \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a; \\ C_a \delta_v &\geq -s_v, & \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a; \\ \delta_v &\in \mathcal{U}_v 0, & \forall v \in \mathcal{V}_a. \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

# Algorithms: Step 2 Each Node Computes $\lambda_v$



$$\lambda_v(t+1) \in \arg \max_{0 \leq \lambda_v \leq V C_l 1_v} -\frac{1}{2} \lambda_v^T \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{U}_v^{-1} \mathbf{X}_v^T \mathbf{Y}_v \lambda_v + (\mathbf{1}_v + \mathbf{Y}_v \mathbf{X}_v \mathbf{U}_v^{-1} \mathbf{f}_v(t))^T \lambda_v, \quad (21)$$



where

$$\mathbf{U}_v = (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) + 2\eta |\mathcal{B}_v| \mathbf{I}_{p+1},$$

$$\mathbf{f}_v(t) = V_a C_l \delta_v(t) + 2\alpha_v(t) - \eta \sum_{u \in \mathcal{U}_v} (\mathbf{r}_v(t) + \mathbf{r}_u(t)).$$



# Algorithms: Step 3 Each Node Computes $r_v$





$$\mathbf{r}_v(t+1) = \mathbf{U}_v^{-1} \left( \mathbf{X}_v^T \mathbf{Y}_v \lambda_v(t+1) - \mathbf{f}_v(t) \right), \quad (22)$$

where

$$\mathbf{U}_v = (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) + 2\eta |\mathcal{B}_v| \mathbf{I}_{p+1},$$
$$\mathbf{f}_v(t) = V_a C_l \delta_v(t) + 2\alpha_v(t) - \eta \sum_{u \in \mathcal{U}_v} (\mathbf{r}_v(t) + \mathbf{r}_u(t)).$$

# Algorithms: Step 4 Each Node Broadcasts $\mathbf{r}_v$ to Neighbors





$$\mathbf{r}_v(t+1) = \mathbf{U}_v^{-1} \left( \mathbf{X}_v^T \mathbf{Y}_v \lambda_v(t+1) - \mathbf{f}_v(t) \right), \quad (23)$$

where

$$\mathbf{U}_v = (\mathbf{I}_{p+1} - \Pi_{p+1}) + 2\eta |\mathcal{B}_v| \mathbf{I}_{p+1},$$
$$\mathbf{f}_v(t) = V_a C_l \delta_v(t) + 2\alpha_v(t) - \eta \sum_{u \in \mathcal{U}_v} (\mathbf{r}_v(t) + \mathbf{r}_u(t)).$$



# Algorithms: Step 5 Each Node Computes $\alpha_v$



$$\alpha_v(t+1) = \alpha_v(t) + \frac{\eta}{2} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{B}_v} [\mathbf{r}_v(t+1) - \mathbf{r}_u(t+1)], \quad (24)$$


- Return to Step 1, until convergence.

# Secure and Resilient Algorithms



- It is a **fully decentralized network operation**, and it does not require exchanging training data or the value of decision functions.
- It provides the **reduced communication overhead** and **privacy preservation** at the same time.



# Numerical Experiment: Testing Experiment



- A network with 4 nodes, each node contains 50 labeled 2-dimension training samples and 50 testing samples from global training set which is shown in this figure.
- The attacker uses the atomic action set with  $C_\delta = 100$  and  $C_a = 1$ .

# Effect of Parameters $C_a$ and $C_\delta$


Evolution of the risk of ADMoM-DSVM. Assume that attacker can attack any nodes. Network: 10 nodes, each node has 3 neighbors.



- The left figure shows that the **attacker has less influence** on learner's performance if we **increase the cost** of the attacker ( $C_a$ ).
- The right figure shows that the **attacker has more influence** on learner if we **increase the size of attacker's action sets** ( $C_\delta$ ).

# Effect of the Number of Nodes the Attacker Can Take Over


Evolution of the risk under different numbers of nodes the attacker can take over.




- We can conclude that if the **attacker** has the ability of **taking over more nodes**, he will create a **higher impact** on the learner.

# Effect of Network Topology

## Average risk in *star* network.



(c) Star



(d) Result:Star

- Fig. (c) shows the network topology.
- Fig. (d) shows the average risk.
- Nodes with **more neighbors (blue)** turn out to have **more influence** on performance as we increase the ability of the attacker ( $C_\delta / C_a$ ).



# Conclusions

## Contributions

- Capture the attacker's objective and constrained capabilities in a game-theoretic framework.
- Develop a nonzero-sum game to model the strategic interactions between an attacker and a learner with a distributed set of nodes.
- Show the strategic equivalence between the original nonzero-sum game and a zero-sum game.
- Demonstrate that network topology plays an important role in resilience to adversary behaviors.

## Future works

- Design network topologies to achieve a desirable level of resiliency.
- Extend to distributed nonlinear SVMs, and other machine learning algorithms.